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Abstract 
Deep packet inspection at high speed has become 
extremely important due to its application in a wide 
range of network applications, such as network 
security and network monitoring. Network intrusion 
detection system (NIDS) uses a collection of 
signatures of known security threats and viruses to 
scan the payload of each packet. Signatures are often 
specified in the form of regular expressions (regex), 
called patterns, which are traditionally implemented 
as finite automata. Deterministic Finite Automata 
(DFA) is fast, but requires prohibitive amounts of 
memory which limits their practical use. Instead of 
matching an incoming packet with each individual 
regex in a ruleset, we match the packet with a fixed 
substring, called fingerprint, of a regex first. Fixed 
string matching is faster and consumes less energy 
than regex matching. The fact is that if a packet does 
not match with the fingerprint of a regex, it will not 
match the regex itself. So fingerprints can be used in 
a prefilter engine to filter out those packets and do not 
match any of the fingerprints of the regex in a rule set, 
which represents normal non-malicious traffic. This 
actually reduces the number of regex rules being 
matched, which results in increased throughput of the 
NIDS. We present a weight scheme to extract a good 
fingerprint from a regex. A good fingerprint is the 
one that not only indicates the regex uniquely, but 
also occurs as less as possible in the matching 
procedure. We demonstrate how to use fingerprints 
for efficient prefiltering by means of Bloom filters in 
practice. 
KeyWords: deterministic finite automata, prefilter,
weight scheme, bloom filter, deep packet inspection.
1  Introduction 
There is an increasing demand for network devices 
capable of examining the content of data packets in 
order to improve network security and provide 
application-specific services. Deep packet inspection 
(DPI) is widely used in intrusion detection systems 
for deterring, detecting and deflecting malicious 
attacks over the network. Nearly all intrusion 
detection systems have the ability to search through 
packets and identify contents that match against 
known attacks.   
There are a wide variety of attacks. Thus each 
packet needs to be matched against thousands of 
attack signatures. For example, the SNORT [1] 
network intrusion detection system (NIDS) has 9182
rules as of October 2008, each contains attack 
signatures. 
SNORT is a popular open-source intrusion 
detection system, with millions of downloads to date. 
It can be configured to perform protocol analysis, 
content searching and matching on real-time traffic to 
detect a variety of worms, attacks and probes. 
The goal of the Linux L7-filter [2] is to detect the 
application layer protocols. Currently, the L7-filter 
application contains 111 application protocol 
signatures, contributed by researchers and developers 
world-wide.  
Bloom filters have recently become popular within 
the networking community because they are suitable 
for high-speed implementations besides enabling 
novel algorithmic solutions to key networking 
problems, such as packet forwarding, traffic 
measurements and security checking. The primary 
use of a standard Bloom filter is for determining set 
membership: does an element x belong to a given set
S? Its probabilistic nature makes it produce false 
positives; that is, it may declare that x belongs to S
even when this is not the case. But in real 
applications, we always try to minimize the false 
positives as much as possible. 
Because pattern matching is time consuming and 
malicious traffic only takes a small percentage of the 
whole traffic, it’s not necessary to check every 
incoming packet with the whole pattern set, which 
may contains complicated regular expressions. 
Therefore, in order to speed up the pattern matching 
process and utilize the characteristics of the traffic, 
prefilter technology help create such an opportunity 
to speed up the pattern matching process by replacing 
most of regex matching with faster fixed string 
(fingerprint) matching. 
In this paper, we describe the following two 
problems of prefilter engine and propose the 
corresponding solutions. Our contributions are: 
 The introduction of a weight scheme to choose ________________________________ 
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good fingerprint from the extracted substring 
candidates of a pattern. 
 The introduction of splitting sliding windows 
corresponding to the bloom filters for most 
frequently occurring string lengths so as to make full 
use of the fingerprints more efficiently.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The 
related works is presented in section II, The problem 
descriptions are illustrated in section III. The 
methodology is provided in section IV and concludes 
the whole paper in section V. 
2  Related works 
In software implementations, Snort is an open 
source rule-driven NIDS. With millions of 
downloads to date, Snort is the most widely deployed 
NIDS, and has established itself as the de facto 
standard of the industry. Snort utilizes the signature, 
protocol, and anomaly based methods to perform 
deep packet inspection. At the core of Snort is a 
multi-pattern matching engine based on the 
Wu-Manber algorithm [3] as the prefilter that checks 
the payload of the packet against a given set of string 
patterns extracted from regular expression patterns. If
one string pattern is matched, the corresponding 
regex pattern will be checked at the verification 
process. Limited by the software implementation, the 
throughput of Snort can only achieve several hundred 
Mbps. 
In hardware implementation, Bloom filter and 
TCAM are used to implement the prefilter. 
Dharmapurikar et al [4] proposed a DPI architecture 
with multiple parallel Bloom filters. Bloom filter is a 
memory efficient hashing structure which can be 
used to query if an input string is a member of the 
pattern set. The query result can be false positive but 
not false negative. The query time is unrelated to the 
number of members in the set. The storage space is 
linear to the number of members in the set. Simple 
string sub-pattern is extracted from each pattern in 
the pattern set and divided into several groups based 
on the string length. One Bloom filter corresponds to 
a group of string-sub patterns.  If an input string is 
matched by one of the Bloom filters, the input string 
will be further verified with the corresponding 
original integrated patterns. Bloom filter has two 
major drawbacks. Firstly, there should be one Bloom 
filter for each pattern length. The hardware cost can 
be prohibitive if the number of distinct pattern 
lengths is large. Secondly, this method suffers from 
the member set explosion problem when it is applied 
to regular expressions with character subclasses. 
Consider a pcre pattern that specifies 10 digits, 
“\d{10}”. To detect this pattern, we need to 
enumerate all possible strings with 10 digits, i.e. the 
size of the member set is 1010. The length of the bit 
vector becomes unmanageable. 
TCAM has been widely deployed in Internet 
routers for IP address lookup and packet 
classification [5]. A TCAM cell can store one of the 
three values {0, 1, * (don’t care)}. TCAM has an 
advantage in handling case-insensitive strings. The 
ASCII code of a lower case letter differs from that of 
the corresponding upper case letter at the 3rd most 
significant bit. Case-insensitive strings can be 
matched by setting the value of that bit to do not care 
in the TCAM entry. The word length of TCAM is 
limited (the most popular TCAM devices available in 
the market support word length of w=18 bytes). 
Strings longer than w bytes need to be divided into 
multiple segments. In the method of [6], the search 
engine maintains a processing window of w bytes 
that slides along the input buffer one byte per cycle. 
Auxiliary data structures, such as a partial hit list and 
a match table, are required to record the matching 
status of long strings. For 250MHz TCAM, the 
maximum throughput of the search engine is limited 
to 2Gbps.  
Liu et al proposed an alternative two-stage 
approach that allowed the processing window to be 
shifted by multiple bytes per cycle [7]. The first stage 
is implemented in TCAM while the second stage in 
SRAM with an embedded comparator. The w-byte 
segment of a pattern {c1, c2 …, cw} is stored in the 
TCAM in a staggered manner: {c1, c2 …, cw}, {*, c1,
c2…, cw-1}, {*, *, c1, c2 …, cw-2}, and so on. 
Characters in the processing window are compared to 
the staggered strings in parallel. The TCAM stage 
serves to identify potential matching patterns and the 
second stage will verify if the specific pattern can be 
found at the given location in the input stream. Liu’s 
implementation only supports simple exact match in 
the second stage, which is obviously inadequate in 
handling pcre patterns found in the Snort rule 
database. 
Although TCAM offers some advantage in 
handling case-insensitive strings, it falls short in 
dealing with pcre patterns with character subclasses. 
Let’s consider the example where we have a string of 
10 digits. A digit can be represented using two 8-bit 
patterns, 0011 0xxx and 0011 100x. To detect any 
combination of 10 digits, 210 TCAM entries are 
needed. A small number of pcre patterns can easily 
consume all the TCAM storages. 
3  Problem statement 
In this section, we first discuss the approaches to 
use regular expression matching in packet payload 
scanning applications, then present the definition of
fingerprint in prefilter engine area, and finally state 
the problem that we have addressed in this paper. 
A regular expression describes a set of strings 
without enumerating them explicitly. For example, 
consider a regular expression: “abc(ac|ad).*bd”.
This pattern matches any packet payload that starts 
with abc, followed by ac or ad, and some arbitrary 
characters, and finally end with bd. 
Regular expression is powerful, however, it is time 
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consuming to generate corresponding DFA and cost 
huge memory usage even we could transfer a regex to 
a DFA successfully. So some prefilter based 
applications have been proposed to enhance the 
packet payload scanning speed. The prefilter based 
application performs string matching on subparts of a 
signature, invoking the matching procedure for the 
full regular expression only when a subpart has been 
matched. Such as Snort that can achieve good 
performance with content filter scheme. 
How to select fingerprint is the crucial part of 
prefilter engine because it has a direct relationship 
with the usefulness or not. Using unambiguous and 
unique fingerprint, we could get an agreeable 
throughput in NIDS. Contrarily, the prefilter 
matching systems become vulnerable and useless if 
using bad fingerprints. 
Fingerprints are several explicit sub-strings from a
certain regular expression. A good fingerprint is the 
one that not only indicates the regex uniquely, but 
also occurs as less as possible in the matching 
procedure. 
For a set of regex patterns, we construct a 
“fingerprint DFA”. When certain fingerprints are 
matched by “fingerprint DFA”, the DFA of the 
original regular expression is looked-up to confirm 
whether there is a match in the input sequence. 
There are three selection criteria for extracting a 
good fingerprint: 
1) It is better uniquely identify the corresponding 
original signatures. 
2) The chance of matching with multiple 
fingerprints is small. 
3) The occurrence of fingerprint is low, in other 
word,   the possibility of its corresponding regex 
accurate matching being triggered is small, so as to 
improve the effectiveness of prefiltering. 
As the occurrence of different fingerprints of a 
pattern is varying from each other, we need to seek 
the fingerprints with the lowest matching possibility. 
Here we define the scope of the problem as 
follows: 
 For a given set of patterns, how to extract a good 
fingerprint for each of them? 
 How to use the refined fingerprints effectively 
in the real applications such as Snort or ClamAV 
[8]?  
Four fixed substrings could be extracted from the 
example pattern “abc(ac|ad).*bd”,  i.e., abc, ac, ad
and bd. Each of them is a candidate fingerprint of the 
original pattern. Which fixed substring is selected as 
a fingerprint for a pattern is not decided 
independently from the other patterns in the ruleset. 
The procedure is to extract fixed substrings for 
each pattern first; then the selection of a fixed 
substring as fingerprint for each string is decided 
jointly at the same time. The criteria are: 1). each 
pattern has a unique fingerprint, i.e. no two patterns 
shares the same fingerprint; 2). the fingerprints are 
efficient for use in a prefilter engine. For example if 
abc is a fixed substring for two patterns, then abc 
should not be chosen as fingerprint for any of the 
patterns, as if there is a match of abc in the prefilter 
engine, it is not clear which pattern should be used 
for exact matching. 
Taking these factors into account, we present a 
weight scheme to evaluate the efficiency of the 
fingerprints. In next section, we present a weighting 
scheme and an algorithm to extract a good fingerprint 
for a pattern.  
4  Methodology 
L7-filter rule set does not have as many rules as 
Snort, so that it is unnecessary to use advanced data 
structures like bloom filter. There are only 111 rules 
in the newest version L7-filter according to the 
statistics released in Dec 2008.
There are 88 rules in L7-filter starting with ‘^’
while 21 rules do not start with ‘^’ but followed by 
simple strings. It means that the majority number of 
rules can be extracted to fixed contents. As an 
example, consider rule poco:
/^\x80\x94\x0a\x01....\x1f\x9e/, which can be extracted 
to “\x80\x94\x0a\x01” and “\x1f\x9e”. Nearly 80% of 
the L7-filter rule set can be processed via this 
method. 
Although prefilter engine enhances the 
performance of the overall matching system, we have 
to say, there still exist some rules that no suitable 
fingerprints could be extracted for using in prefilter 
engine. For example this rule: “abc|[^de]{10}”, is 
split in to two parts by the or symbol ‘|’. We could 
not conclude that the incoming stream does not 
match the pattern if substring abc has not been found 
in it as it matches the second part. However it is hard 
to extract a fixed string as fingerprint for the second 
part. For accuracy, we consider this kind of rules as 
complicated rules and present the following 
architecture to guarantee all the situations have been 
considered. 
As is shown in Figure 1, when incoming streams 
arriving at the prefilter engine for those patterns that 
have fixed substring as fingerprint, they are detected 
by the prefilter engine and split as two parts: matched 
traffic and unmatched traffic. The former one is to be 
send to the corresponding regex whose fingerprint 
has been matched in the Prefilter Engine (PE) to 
make an accurate matching. Similarly, the 
unmatched traffic after PE is send to the 
corresponding regexes which do not have 
fingerprints to make an accurate matching. If the 
regex is matched by regex accurate matching engine 
(AE), NIDS will issue an alarming message to users 
to indicate the incoming traffic is a malicious one. 
Otherwise it is a normal traffic. 
4.1  Evaluate fingerprint via  a weighting sheme 
We set the default weight of each candidate 
fingerprint as the reciprocal of the numbers of 
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fingerprint candidates in the corresponding pattern. 
Take the previous pattern as an example, 
“abc(ac|ad).*bd”, there are 4 fingerprint candidates, 
so the weight of each of the four fingerprint 
candidates is 1/4 = 0.25. 
matched by
PE
Prefilter Engine
(PE)
packets
Regex accurate
matching Engine
(AE) whose
fingerprints not
matched in the
PE
no
Regex accurate matching
Engine (AE) whose fingerprints
matched in the PE
yes
matched by
AE
matched by
AE
no
yes
no
yes
Un-malicious
traffic
Malicious
traffic
Figure 1 Architecture of prefilter engine 
The Levenshtein distance [9] between two strings 
is given by the minimum number of operations 
needed to transform one string into the other, where 
an operation refers to an insertion, deletion, or 
substitution of a single character. 
For example, If s is "test" and t is "test", then 
LD(s,t) = 0, because no transformations are needed. 
The strings are already identical. If s is "test" and t is 
"tent", then LD(s,t) = 1, because one substitution 
(change ‘s’ to ‘n’) is sufficient to transform s into t.
The greater the Levenshtein distance, the more 
different the strings are. 
We denote the similarity 
as 1 -  LD(s, t) / max( |s| , |t| ) , LD(s, t) is an 
abbreviation of the value of Levenshtein distance 
between string s and t, |s|means the length of string 
s. 
Pseudo-code of weight calculation and 
modification is given in Algorithm 1. 
__________________ ____________________________ 
For each pattern Pi in rule set
extract the candidates Si,j of Pi
set weight Wi,j for Si,j respectively 
add Si,j  into static candidates rule set C according 
to different groups 
End 
For any pair of candidate Si,j and Sm,n in different 
groups of C   
// Sm,n is the nth candidate of Pattern Pm
Wi,j := the weight of Si,j 
Wm,n := the weight of Sm,n 
calculate the similarity s between Si,j and Sm,n 
// abs[] is the absolute value function 
Wm,n := abs[Wm,n – Avg(Wm,n + Wi,j )*s] if Sm,n 
contains Si,j
Wi,j := abs[Wi,j – Avg(Wi,j + Wm,n )*s] if Si,j 
contains Sm,n 
        
Update Wm,n , Wi,j  of  C
End
             
_______________________________________________
Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code of fingerprints evaluation 
After the above procedure, we make a loop for 
each pattern to get the fingerprint candidate that has 
the biggest weight value in this pattern. The 
fingerprint result set can be considered a basic and 
direct fixed string rule set in prefilter engine.  
We take the following example to illustrate the 
above algorithm. Given 4 real patterns (0 4)iP i 
of Snort: 
P1 = /^USER\s[^\n]*?%[^\n]*?%/; 
P2 = /^USER\s+y049575046/; 
P3 = /^Content-Type\s*\x3a\s*image\x2fgif/; 
P4 = /^Content-Type\x3a\s*application\x2fsmi.*? 
<area[\s\n\r]+href=[\x22\x27]file\x3ajavascr
ipt\x3a/,
 For each pattern in a ruleset, extract fixed 
substrings as candidate fingerprints for the pattern. 
We could extract 4 corresponding groups substring 
candidates , (0 4;0 )i jS i j    as following: 

1 1,1:P S USER  ; 

2 2,1 2,2: , y049575046P S USER S    ; 
3 3,1 3,2: Content-Type, image,P S S    
3,3 gifS  ; 
4 4,1 4,2: Content-Type, application,P S S   
4,3 4,4area  javascriptS S 	  .
As defined, If there are Ni candidate fingerprints 
for pattern Pi, then each candidate fingerprint FPi,j (j 
= 1 to Ni) is assigned an initial weight Wi,j = 1/Ni: 
1 11:P W  


 ; 
2 2,1 2,2:P W W  
  ; 
3 3,1 3,2 3,3:P W W W   
 
4 4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4:P W W W W    
  . 
Then we add all the candidates and their weight of 
each pattern into set C according to different groups: 
1,1
2,1 2,2
3,1 3,2 3,3
4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4
: { { },
{ },
{ },
{ }}
C S
S S
S S S
S S S S

    	
 
  		 	 
  		 		 	 
  		 		 		 	
Iteratively we calculate the similarity s for any two 
pair candidates in different groups and modify their 
corresponding weight. Calculate a similarity s
between FPi,j and each candidate fingerprints FPm,n
of all other patterns in the ruleset, update Wi,j and 
Wm,n as follows: 
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1,1
2,1 2,2
3,1 3,2 3,3
4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4
: { { },
{ },
{ },
{ }}
C S
S S
S S S
S S S S

    	
 
  		 	 
  		 		 	 
  	
	 	

	 		 	

. 
We make a loop for each pattern to get the 
fingerprint candidate that has the biggest weight 
value in this pattern. As a result, the good fingerprint 
could be selected as: 1,1S  for 1P , 2,2S for 2P ? 3,3S
for 3P  and 4,3S  for 4P . 
4.2  Splitting sliding windows 
How to use the refined fingerprint set reasonable is 
the main problem next step. Some solutions have to 
be considered to utilize the above fixed strings 
efficiently. 
Dharmapurikar et al. proposed a hardware 
architecture based on parallel Bloom filters for 
network packet inspection [4]. In order to perform 
the input streaming detection, the original 
architecture is designed to use multiple Bloom filters 
each of which detects strings of a unique length [10]. 
However, the more Bloom Filters we use the more 
processing time and resources it takes. To reduce the 
number of Bloom Filters, a few sliding windows are 
constructed to process the continuous input streams 
and flows by the n popular string lengths of these 
rules. 
For instance, we take Snort rule sets as an example. 
Snort works by matching traffic patterns to its rules, 
stored in a rule set. The captured packets are passed 
through a packet decoder, which determines which 
protocol is in use for a given packet and matches the 
payload data against allowable behavior for patterns 
of that protocol. The content keyword is one of the 
important features of Snort. It allows the user to set 
rules that search for specific content in the packet 
payload and trigger response based on that data.  
By extracting those unique content keywords from 
snort rule set, we can get string length distribution in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2. String length distributions in snort V2.8.4. 
Obviously, there are four types of length which 
dominate the whole length distribution of patterns. 
Here we set n equals to 4. Thereafter only 4-byte BF, 
7-byte BF, 36-byte BF and 180-byte BF will be 
constructed. To make efficient use of Bloom filters, 
strings are clustered with different lengths in a group, 
and strings are truncated to the length of the shortest 
string in the group. For instance, all the string length 
more than 7 but less than 36 will be truncated to 7 
from the beginning of each string. Specially, content 
fields of less than 4 bytes will be rewritten to get rid 
of its ambiguous character. Furthermore, one special 
small test engine is added to detect the length which 
is less than 4 bytes in simple rules. 
Similarly, as is shown in Figure 3, we can see that 
there is various pattern length distributions in 
ClamAV rule set. Here we use main.ndb rule set in 
ClamAV. 
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Figure 3 Pattern length distributions of main.ndb in 
ClamAV 0.95.1. 
There are 58574 patterns in it while 69237 fixed 
strings after extraction according to wildcards. The 
candidates’ number which extracted from patterns by 
wildcard is shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 Selected DFA groups of different size
wildcard # of patterns
* 4580
{} 6152
? 3325
Since we have more fingerprint candidates in 
ClamAV, it is unavoidable to meet conflicts when the 
string is truncated to small length. In this situation, 
we shift one character from left to right to test if there 
is an occurrence in the original fingerprint sets. 
This prefilter engine could filter 22.8% 
un-malicious data. To analyze the factors that 
influence the filtering ratio, we record matched 
keywords during the process. Some simple characters, 
such as, ‘a’ and ‘u’ are found in the recorded result 
file. This is because multiple content fields exist in 
some rules, such as the backdoor in snort V2.8.4. 
These multiple content keywords, like: content: 
“from|3A|”, content: “a” have significant influence 
on the filtering ratio. By rewriting or refining these 
rules, we could get an agreeable filtering ratio of 
approximate 62.5% of un-malicious data. 
To make this architecture robust, we can train it via 
adjusting the settings of bloom filter. We know that 
the filtering ratio will be different for different input 
data. Then some bad traffic that has been detected 
previously can be used to train our prefilter engine. 
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We can also mix malicious part with normal trace to 
make this training. 
5  Conclusions  
We introduced the basic concept of prefilter and 
how it works in NIDS. A weight scheme has been 
presented to choose good fingerprint from the 
extracted substring candidates of a pattern. 
We used fingerprints extracted with our algorithm 
in the patterns of Snort and did experiment with real 
trace. According to the statistics of our simulations, 
the filter ratio can reach up to 60% if the whole 
engine has been trained well.  It has been showed that 
this engine could enhance the capabilities of 
general-purpose IDS solutions. 
There are some issues to be thought about in future. 
For example, if a new pattern is added to a rule set, in 
which all patterns have their fingerprints been 
decided already, then when select a fingerprint for 
the newly added pattern, it would be inconvenient to 
update the existing fingerprints for the patterns in the 
original ruleset. So a solution is needed to be found to 
choose a good fingerprint for the newly added pattern 
without changing the fingerprints of the patterns in 
the original ruleset.  
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